We investigate cartelists' merger behavior using European Commission (EC) cartel decisions over a 28-year span and information on cartelists' merger activities over the last 30 years. We find that mergers occur frequently but that they cluster in a few particular industries and usually include only a minority of the cartel participants. The EC's leniency program appears to expedite mergers, while the EC's cartel settlement procedure appears to delay mergers. After cartel dissolution, coconspirators merge at a substantially greater pace. The results shed light on the design of merger policies and enforcement programs against cartels.
Introduction
Changes in ownership and control are frequent among cartel co-conspirators: in over onethird of the cartels discovered by the European Commission (hereafter "EC") between 1985 and 2012, conspirators sold majority shares or relocated major production and sales capacities to their co-conspirators. What motivated the conspirators to merge? The EC introduced a leniency program in July 1996, with the intent of destabilizing and deterring cartels. The program gave the first-in cartel confessor the opportunity to avoid sanctions (subject to certain conditions). In February 2002, the program was revised to guarantee automatic immunity for first-in confessors. While before July 1996 there was, on average, one merger or joint venture in every 40 cartels per year, the rate more than doubled during the period July 1996 to June 2008.
In June 2008, the EC introduced a settlement procedure through which late confessors may obtain fine reductions outside the leniency program. Following the settlement introduction, merger and joint venture rates fell below the pre-leniency levels.
This paper is one of the first to provide a systematic empirical analysis of the dynamic nature of horizontal mergers among co-conspirators, from the date that a firm joins a cartel, to the time that it mergers with a co-conspirator, and up to the firm's liquidation, bankruptcy, or cessation of production. The main objectives are to describe the distribution of mergers over time and examine the determinants of mergers. Particular emphasis is placed on the effect on merger timing of the EC's leniency program and settlement procedure and the effect of cartel termination.
Despite extensive research on mergers and cartels, the link between the two forms of industrial organization has received little attention.
1 Two notable exceptions are Bittlingmayer Other related earlier work includes Mueller (1996) who reviews the history of US antimerger policy, Boone (2006) who shows that firms may use inefficient merger to relax competition constraints, and Vasconcelos (2005) who studies the effect of merger on cartel stability in the presence of cost asymmetry.
Little systematic analysis has been performed regarding the importance of cartel dissolution for the variations in merger patterns over time and across firms and antitrust policies: A glance at the sample of mergers by the EC's convicted cartelists in period December 1983 to July 1996 reveals that nearly two-thirds of the mergers occurred before the conspirators ceased collusion; however, the pattern is reversed after July 1996, when the great majority of mergers took place after a conspirator left the cartel. Probing further into the data reveals that mergers usually included only a minority of the cartel members and clustered in a few particular industries.
The empirical analysis of merger by cartelists so far has largely overlooked these variations.
Our research is motivated by the relatively meager understanding of the dynamics of merger activity among cartel members. We use reduced-form Poisson regression to test whether merger rates increase following leniency introduction and whether the rates fall following the introduction of a settlement procedure. We use multiple-spell discrete-time hazard regression to test whether the leniency programs expedite merger and whether the settlement procedure delays merger. The hazard models also enable us to test the effect of cartel breakdown on merger that is suggested by the recent theory . We are able to control for economic Our data consist of the complete set of cartel decisions issued by the European Commission (hereafter "EC") and the European Court of Justice between December 18, 1985, and October 19, 2013 . We merge the cartel data with a data set of conspirators' merger, acquisition and joint venture activities (hereafter they are collectively referred to as "merger" unless mentioned otherwise) between April 1983 and December 2012. The EC's leniency introduction on July 18, 1996 , and the introduction of cartel settlement procedure on June 30, 2008, provide exogenous shocks that identify the effect of cartel enforcement innovations on merger.
Our first principal finding is that the EC's leniency programs increase the frequency and pace of mergers. The impacts are statistically significant, large in magnitude, and robust to various sample choices and specifications. The result is intuitive: firms prefer collusion until the policy environment makes it harder for cartels to survive, suggesting that the incremental profit of collusion over merger may have decreased following the 1996 leniency introduction.
Our second principal finding is that the EC's cartel settlement procedure decreased merger frequency and pace. As discussed above, the procedure grants second-in or subsequent leniency applicants fine reductions outside of the leniency program. This finding is consistent with our first finding because it suggests that a punishment differential between the first and subsequent cartel confessors is an important component in conspirators' merger decisions.
Together, these findings suggest that it is worthwhile to explore explanations that posit monopoly gain as the reason for collusion and for merger induced by changes in the mode of market competition (e.g., Hackbarth and Miao, 2011; .
Finally, we find that cartel breakdown expedites merger. The result is consistent with the view that ex-conspirators often try to restore the status quo by merging to lessen competitive pressures (Evenett et al., 2001; Boone 2006; Levenstein, 2013) . Our results suggests that vigilance against collusion should continue after cartel breakdown.
Our analysis is subject to the limitation that almost one-third of the sampled cartels affected the US markets and were investigated by the DOJ. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the DOJ's investigation often predates the EC's. 2 Due to data availability, 3 however, we have used the event of EC inspection to identify the impact of antitrust enforcement. In this way, our identification strategy might give rise to spurious estimates of the enforcement effect. To remedy this, at least in part, in robustness checks we exclude cartels with US market coverage.
Our approach closely follows that of Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014) , who study the dynamics of merger in a sample of EC detected cartels. We focus on the same set of cartels, but extend the time coverage of the sample. We differ in the treatment of the sample: when an EC decision covers multiple products, we treat these as separate cartels, whereas Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014) view that as one cartel, which addresses an issue that affects our treatment of the same merger occurring in more than one cartel. By viewing these as separate cartels, we are able to capture the difference in the dissolution dates. 4 The separation also makes the definition of the rivals in our sample more accurate. 3 The DOJ maintains strict confidentiality regarding the schedule of its cartel investigation. Although it is possible to find data or make inferences in some cases, more commonly the starting date of an investigation is unknowable from publicly available data. competitors in the defined product market as they are identified by the EC in its in-depth investigations" (Duso et al., 2013) . 6 Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014) focus on postcollusion periods, which focuses the analysis on activity that occurs after cartel dissolution.
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We also consider mergers that take place before the dissolution of the cartel. 8 By doing so we increase the power of the inference because we can rule out a declining trend in merger activity that extends back into the cartel period.
Similar to Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014), we discuss the impact of leniency on mergers. However, we use a different identification strategy. We use the date of the introduction of leniency to identify the impact of leniency, whereas Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014) use the cause of the investigation. We chose to focus on the date of the introduction of leniency in order to avoid concerns about causality and measurement problems. For example, conspirators may apply for leniency long after a cartel dissolves (Gärtner and Zhou 2013).
9
These delayed applications may be affected by post-breakdown mergers. Moreover, "[f]ormer price-fixers often try to effectively restore the status quo ante by merging..." (Evenett et al., 2001 ). In such cases, a leniency program may affect a contemplated merger (by affecting the expected stability of the follow-up conspiracy) irrespective of the cause of investigation in previous infringements.
We follow Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014) in using a duration analysis framework and modeling mergers as recurrent events. They use continuous-time methods to estimate the worldwide are Roche and BASF" (see Case COMP/E-1/37.512 Vitamins), Roche and BASF could not be rivals of Solvay and Merk on these markets. 6 In a study of EU mergers, Duso, Gugler and Szücs (2013) similarly emphasize the importance of defining rivals by using the markets identified by the EC in its antitrust investigation. 7 As described in Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014), this choice has advantages in terms of avoiding confounding effects associated with using cartel-period data and mitigating issues of censoring as fewer firms are available to merge over time. 12 Our calculation based on the EC cartel decisions issued over the period 1985-2013 shows that 129 firmsabout 18 percent of the total firms-participated in cartels on different product markets. 13 The advantages of adopting a flexible functional form for the baseline hazard in analyzing time to event data have been widely recognized. See, e.g., Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) , Meyer (1990) It should be emphasized that our explanations do not provide a general theory of merger.
Certainly, there are factors other than cartel policies, market competition and the other variables discussed here that influence merger decisions. Our primary goal is to show that a plausible foundation can be constructed for the view that changes in antitrust policy can cause large time, firm, and industry variations in merger activity. Our paper is not an attempt to explain horizontal mergers in general, and we do not rule out the possibility that some mergers would have been formed eventually even if the EC's leniency programs had never been in place.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 characterise the distribution of mergers and JVs over time and examine the factors that influence conspirators' decision to merge. In particular, Section 3.1 examines the evolution over time of the frequency of merger and the elimination of competitors via merger, and Section 3.2 studies the pace of merger at cartel-level. Our sample of mergers and JVs by members of discovered cartels provides evidence that the merger dynamics are significantly and strongly affected by anticartel enforcement. Concluding remarks and possible extensions follow.
Data

Data Source
The primary data for our analysis are the EC cartel decisions and judgments on cartels by 
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The merger data contain, among other things, the dates of merger notification and approval, the percentage of ownership change during a merger, and the degree of a firm's involvement in a JV. Furthermore, we search for transaction records from the following sources: (i) the national competition authorities; (ii) the conspirators' annual reports, press releases, investor information, and company histories, etc.; and (iii) business and financial intelligence such as Bloomberg and Mergerstat Review. 15 The Article 6(1)a decisions pertain to concentrations that do not fall within the scope of the Merger Regulation; the Article 6(1)b decisions pertain to concentrations that do not "raise serious doubts as to their compatibility with the common market"; the Article 6(1)c decisions pertain to concentrations that raise serious doubts (and therefore proceed to Phase II).
The Sample
Rules of Selection
The EC cartel data set currently includes 151 cartels. We select cartels for which we could verify whether a merger or JV occurred. We excluded 11 cartels due to this restriction. 16 To examine the effects of cartel investigations, we restrict the sample to cartels for which the date of the initiation of the EC's investigation is known. We drop one cartel due to this restriction. From the remaining cartels, we find 129 mergers and 18 JVs.
To estimate the probability of merger and JV over time, we consider mergers and JVs that are successful, result in a completed transaction, and for which the date of transaction and the degree of ownership and control changes are known. Moreover, because our analysis concerns the transfer of corporate decision rights, we consider only mergers and JVs that meet one of the following criteria: (i) the acquiring conspirator ends up with more than 50% of the shares of the acquired co-conspirator (or subsidiary), and the acquiring conspirator controlled less than 50% of the shares of the target before the announcement; (ii) two (or more) conspirators jointly acquired control of a non-conspirator that did not participate in the cartel prior to the announcement; (iii) a non-conspirator acquired more than 50% of the shares from two (or more)
conspirators; (iv) a JV was set up to carry out more than 50% of the sales or production of at least one of the conspirators, and the JV carried out less than 50% of the conspirator's activity before the announcement.
Our requirements yield a sample of 135 successful transactions (118 mergers and 17 JVs).
They were undertaken by 187 firms from 55 cartels. We refer to these cartels as our cartel-level merger sample. The first transaction took place in December 1983 and the last in October 2012.
There were 84 cartels that did not go through a merger or set up a JV, or went through a transaction but failed criteria (i)-(iv). The estimation of merger timing must consider the censoring of the time-to-merger for cartels with no observed merger events. In these cases, we can only infer that the time-to-merger would have exceeded the observed time elapsed from the start of an infringement, but is censored at the time of data collection or the date of the firm's exit (because of liquidation, bankruptcy, or cessation of production). We refer to the cartel-level merger and non-merger samples together as the cartel-level full sample. 16 These cartels are operated by trade associations or shipping conferences who are the addressees of the cartel decisions. The identity of the involved firms is usually undisclosed.
Variable Definition and Summary Statistics
The main variables and model parameters are defined in Table 1 , and the corresponding descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 .
Column 1 of Table 2 gives descriptive statistics for the full sample. The remaining columns
give descriptive statistics for the merger sample.
[ Table 1 about here]
[ Table 2 about here]
Empirical Analysis
The analysis starts by looking at changes in the number of mergers over time. At this step, our analysis runs at an aggregate level where mergers in different cartels and by different firms are grouped together and the only sample variation comes from changes through time. In the sections to follow, the analysis will consider cartel-level variation.
The Number of Mergers
Graphical Analysis
We start by graphing the distribution of merger activities over time. We create a series of after July 1996 when the EC leniency program was introduced, and falls in recent years. In our tests, we often use time-varying predictors (e.g., cartel policies, macroeconomic conditions, etc.) to take into account these changes.
[ Figure 1 about here]
A potential caveat to the analysis above is that the time-varying pattern of merger rates in Figure 1 may be driven by the arrival of new cartels over time, with the latter periods including more sampled cartels than the earlier periods. To see if this is the case, Panel A of Figure 2 plots the ratio of the total number of mergers and JVs in a period over the total number of sampled cartels in each period. The pattern is similar to that in Figure 1 and shows that the probability of a merger between July 1996 and June 2008 is significantly larger than the probabilities in the pre-leniency and post-settlement periods. Moreover, the high merger rates around the periods 1983 and 1989 should be regarded as outliers rather than the norm. In 24 out of the 28 pre-leniency periods, merger probabilities are below 0.06. Panel B plots the ratio of mergers and JVs over the number of sampled firms in each period. The pattern is similar to that in Panel B.
[ Figure 2 about here]
Regression Analysis
A. Poisson Model
We use a reduced-form Poisson regression to test the effects of policy changes on merger numbers. In the model, the probability of observing that random variable Y t , the number of mergers and JVs in period t, has the realization y t is given by
where the conditional mean λ t is specified as λ t = exp(x We run two statistical tests. First, we examine whether the number of mergers and JVs increases following the introduction of leniency. The hypothesis seems plausible provided that the leniency programs have the intended effect of destabilizing cartels. When tension is created between the conspirators following an effective antitrust innovation (such as leniency), they face an increased need to facilitate coordination through eliminating competitors (in both an 17 Valid inference from a Poisson model requires equidispersion, that is, equality of conditional variance and mean. For robustness, we run a negative binominal model and find that the results regarding the effects of leniency and settlement are similar to those obtained from the Poisson regression and that the dispersion parameter is close to zero.
ongoing infringement and a follow-up infringement after a cartel breakdown). The hypothesis is also plausible provided that leniency has the intended effect of deterring cartels. The increased competition intensity following the leniency introduction provides the ex-conspirators with an incentive to enlarge capacity through a merger so that they can compete more effectively against the rivals. Taking LENIENCY as the omitted category, the regression model generates an increase in mergers and JVs if the PRE-LENIENCY coefficient is negative. We therefore test the hypothesis:
where β P RE denotes the PRE-LENIENCY coefficient. In the second test, we examine whether the number of mergers and JVs falls following the introduction of the settlement procedure.
Because settlement gives late cartel confessors fine reductions outside of the leniency program, it may have the effect of weakening the effectiveness of the leniency program. Therefore, we hypothesize that the need for eliminating competitors through merger decreases following the settlement introduction. Taking LENIENCY as the omitted category, the regression model generates a decrease in mergers and JVs if the SETTLEMENT coefficient is negative. We therefore test the hypothesis:
where β SET T LEM EN T denotes the settlement coefficient. Table 2 reports the main regression results of the effect on the number of mergers and JVs of the antitrust policies we consider. In each regression from columns 1 to 4, the unit of observation is a six-month period and the dependent variable is the number of mergers and JVs. Column 1 includes only the policy indicator. Columns 2 adds the total number of sampled firms and cartels by the end of each period. Column 3 adds the macroeconomic variables. We have information on the macroeconomic fluctuations for only 84 periods. Column 4 includes all the control variables.
B. Regression Results
Starting with the effect of leniency introduction, the estimated PRE-LENIENCY coefficients are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the introduction of the leniency program resulted in increased merger activity. The coefficients in the first row of columns 1 to 4 correspond to 4.47 times, 82.6 percent, 4.61 times, and 1.34 times increases in the number of mergers, respectively, when evaluated at the mean of the control variables.
Turning to the effect of settlement procedure introduction, the estimated SETTLEMENT coefficients are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the introduction of the settlement program resulted in a decreased merger rate. The coefficients in the second row of columns 1 to 4 correspond to 3.22, 1.79, 4.76, and 3.08 times decreases in the number of mergers, respectively, when evaluated at the mean of the control variables.
In addition, the results lend some support for the theoretical findings that merger activity is linked to macroeconomic fluctuations.
Column 5 uses a 12-month period. The estimated policy coefficients remain statistically significant and have the same signs as those in the six-month period cases.
Robustness Checks
Our empirical strategy is implemented using a before-and-after comparison across groups where the date of leniency introduction, July 18, 1996, is viewed as an exogenous shock to identify the impact of leniency. The date of settlement introduction, June 30, 2008 , is used to identify the impact of settlement procedures. One concern is that if alternative shocks, i.e., placebo policies, yield a better fit to the data, then the link between the antitrust policies and the time series of mergers might not be causal. To investigate, we re-run the regression in column 4 of Table 2 using alternative time breakpoints and compare the maximized log-likelihoods across the different specifications.
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Each point in the graphs of Figure 3 corresponds to the maximized log-likelihood of one Poisson regression. The point 0 on the horizontal axes marks the maximized log-likelihood when we impose the shocks at the dates of the leniency introduction. The points to the left (resp. right) of 0 represent the log-likelihoods when we impose the shocks before (resp. after) July 18, 1996 . Panel A uses six-month periods. The maximized log-likelihood generated by leniency (−99.286) is greater than those generated by all but two placebo policies that postdate July 18, 1996. The offending placebo policy shocks are caused by a sharp increase in the number of mergers in the third and fourth periods after July 18, 1996. Panels B uses twelve-month periods. The results are largely similar to those in the six-month case. In the twelve-month case, the model fit generated by leniency is greater than those generated by all but one placebo policy that postdates July 18, 1996. Figure 4 plots the log-likelihoods produced by imposing shocks before and after the introduction of the EC's settlement procedure. When six-months periods are used (Panel A), the maximized log-likelihood produced by the prior leniency policy is greater than those produced by all but one placebo policy that predates the prior leniency policy by two years. The results are similar when three-month periods are used-there are only two offending placebo policies.
Overall, these robustness checks provide some support for the empirical specification.
Cartel-Level Analysis of The Pace of Merger
Descriptive Statistics
Most of the sampled cartels do not experience a merger (61.2%), although it is not rare to observe cartels with more than one mergers (23.7%). In particular, among those with mergers, nearly 40% had at least three mergers, 16% have at least four mergers. At this stage of the cartel-level analysis, we organize our data in such a way that each of the n cartels in our sample contributes to a Cartel-Event data set in which there are N (with N > n) lines of data-one line for every transaction or censoring event for which each cartel was observed. For example, if cartel j has m j merger events, then it has m j + 1 records (lines) of data, where each of the m j records corresponds to a merger or JV, and the last record corresponds to the censoring event (i.e., data collection). Figure 5 plots the distribution of mergers around the time of cartel breakdown. As shown, mergers are infrequent long before and after cartel breakdown. The likelihood of mergers peaks around the time of the cartel breakdown. One-third of the sampled mergers occurred in the three years before the cartel breakdown. Over one-third of the sampled mergers occurred in the three years following the cartel breakdown.
Graphical Analysis
[ Figure 5 about here] Figure 6 explores the effect of the 1996 leniency program on the link between mergers and cartel dissolution. Panel A includes only mergers that occurred before July 18, 1996, the introduction of the EC's leniency program. As shown, the great majority (85.4%) of mergers in this period occurred before a firm ended its cartel involvement. The pattern changed substantially after leniency was introduced, with over two-thirds of the mergers occurring after the firms' exit (Panel B). Together, these graphical analyses suggest that the link between mergers and collusion varies across policy regimes.
[ Figure 6 about here] Next, we graph the non-parametric Kaplan-Meier hazard functions. The empirical hazard is the ratio of the number of observations that merge in a month relative to the number that
had not yet experienced a merger at the start of the month.
19 These functions plot rates of merger against the analysis time, described below.
Let the spell start for the first merger in a cartel be the cartel's birth date. For the second and subsequent mergers, the spell start is the time of the preceding merger. Let the spell end be the earlier of the time of censoring (i.e., data collection on December 31, 2012) and the time of the present merger. The hazards do not evolve monotonically over time ( Figure 7 ).
The hazard is higher between 0 and 35 months and then again between 90 and 120 months.
The first jump is probably caused by the start of the cartel or a recent merger. The second jump is probably caused by the cartel dissolution: the sampled mergers lasted on average 81 months; the majority of cartels experienced less than two mergers, if merger ever occurred.
These points are discussed in more detail later. Furthermore, temporarily putting aside the issue of confounding influence from the time-varying factors, the shape of the hazard function suggests that a flexible baseline hazard specification will probably fit the data better than a monotonic baseline hazard (e.g., Weibull).
In Figure 8 , the analysis time of the pre-leniency hazard profile begins at the spell start and ends at the earlier of the spell end and July 18, 1996. The analysis time of the leniency hazard profile begins at the latter of July 18, 1996, and the spell start. It ends at the earlier of the spell end and June 30, 2008 . The analysis time of the settlement hazard profile begins at the latter of June 30, 2008 , and the spell start, and it ends at the spell end.
[ Figure 7 about here] Panel A of Figure 8 depicts the merger hazards before the 1996 leniency introduction, after the leniency introduction but before the settlement procedure introduction, and after the settlement introduction. As shown, the introduction of the leniency program immediately results in a hazard profile with higher probabilities of merger. The introduction of the settlement procedure immediately result in a hazard profile with lower probabilities of merger.
A potential caveat to the analysis above is that, by design, analysis time of the leniency treatment group (i.e., spells that started after July 18, 1996) is at most 145.5 months (i.e, the time span from July 18, 1996, to June 30, 2008); but a similar selection of short analysis times does not occur to the control group (i.e., spell durations before July 18, 1996) . If the immediate increase in the hazard rates following the leniency introduction were due to such a statistical artefact, one could argue that our result on the relationship between leniency and the observed hazards is driven by misspecification.
To examine whether this is the case, we censor all the spells in the pre-leniency group at month 145.5. Panel B of Figure 7 plots the Kaplan-Meier hazard estimates after the exclusion of long spells. The predicated hazards after the leniency introduction again immediately exceed the pre-leniency levels. Long after the start of the spell, the post-leniency hazards readjust and fall below the pre-leniency levels. The overall effect of leniency introduction, judging from the entire sampling range, is that it expedites merger.
Regression Analysis
A. Empirical Framework
The timing of a merger decision is analyzed naturally in a hazard model framework. A spell in this context refers to a period of time elapsed until a merger or the censoring event (i.e., data collection on December 31, 2012) occurs. Twenty-three of the sampled cartels went through multiple mergers and/or JVs. In these cases, spells may be correlated with the cluster, violating the assumption of independent spells that is required in conventional hazard regression (e.g., Weibull). To address the issue, we consider a multiple-spell hazard specification and model the repeated mergers as "recurrent events," with the spell of the first event starting at the cartel's birth and the spells of the subsequent events starting at the time of the preceding event.
In addition, 129 sampled conspirators participated in multiple cartels whose product markets differ. Failure times may be tied across cartels when a multi-cartel conspirator merge. Ties are present if the different cartels share in common two (or more) adjacent events of interest.
In particular, a non-trivial proportion, 17.4%, of the sampled observations in the Cartel-Event data set are tied. Such a data structure makes discrete-time hazard models a natural candidate for our analysis because the discrete-time methods give consistent estimates of the coefficients and their associated variance in the presence of ties.
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The additional advantages of the discrete-time hazard models include the following: (i) they can easily be extended to account for unobserved individual heterogeneity, even if the sample size is large; (ii) by applying discrete-time hazard models, we can easily circumvent the rather restrictive proportional hazards assumption that sometimes plagues continuous time models (e,g., the Weibull model); and (iii) they can easily handle multiple time-varying covariates, which are of particular interest for the present research.
Let T s be the continuous, non-negative random variable that measures the length of a particular spell s. In a discrete-time framework, the core of duration analysis is formed by the probability that a particular cartel undergoes a merger within a given period [t k ; t k+1 ), where
.., K and t 1 = 0, conditional on not having undergone a merger at the beginning of the interval and given the explanatory variables included in the regression model. This conditional probability is termed the discrete-time hazard rate, and its function is given by
where x sk is a vector of potentially time-varying covariates and γ k is a function of time that allows the hazard rate to vary across different periods within a spell. F (·) is a cumulative distribution function ensuring that 0 ≤ h sk ≤ 1. Here, the subscript s denotes separate spells.
The parameter vector β is the vector of coefficients, measuring the influence of observed characteristics. The term x ′ sk β shifts the hazard function F (·), and a positive coefficient indicates that the observed characteristics increase the merger hazard and reduce the time to merger after a firm joins the cartel.
For each merger spell, the last month in which a merger was observed is recorded. For censored spells, we record the last month for which the data is collected. In the following, this terminal month is denoted k s . The subscript s indicates that it may differ across spells. We introduce a binary variable y sk = 1 if spell s is observed to cease during the kth month, and 20 Alternative approaches to deal with tied failure times in continuous-time hazard models have been developed in the literature, e.g., Breslow (1974) . While computationally undemanding, Breslow's method will be inaccurate if there are many ties in the data set, which happens to be our case.
let y sk = 0 otherwise. The log-likelihood for the observed data is given by
Assuming that F (·) follows a logistic distribution, the parameters can be estimated using a logit model.
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We reformat our data for a discrete-time survival analysis. Although initially each cartel had one record (line) of data for each event of interest, we re-organize the data so that the n spells in the original sample contribute multiple independent observations to a Cartel-SpellPeriod data set in which there are ∑ s k s lines of data-one observation for every time period within every spell for which each cartel in the original sample was observed. Each spell period is 30 days long.
Next, we create three types of new variables for the newly created Cartel-Spell-Period data set: (a) a time period identifier, (b) the event indicator variable, and (c) time-varying covariates.
The time period identifier TIME t j is a sequence of positive integers. It equals one during the first 30-day period after a cartel's start, two during the second period, and so on. The event indicator MERGER t j is a period-specific binary variable. It equals one if a merge occurs in cartel j during the period (t − 30 days, t], it equals 0 otherwise. Finally, we create a set of time-varying policy and macroeconomic covariates to track changes in the policy and economic environments. They are described in Table 1 . The descriptive statistics for the newly created data set are given in Table 5 
where β SET T LEM t denotes the settlement coefficient.
In the third test, we examine whether the pace of merger increases following a cartel breakdown. The regression model generates an increase in the merger pace if the BREAKDOWN t j coefficient is positive. We therefore test the hypothesis:
where β BREAKDOW N t j denotes the breakdown coefficient.
For robustness, we estimate the multiple spell discrete-time hazard model controlling for potentially confounding influences. Duso, Gugler and Szücs (2013) suggest that the EC's 2004 merger reform may affect anticompetitive mergers, and we create a variable that proxy this factor. ECMR04 is a dummy that indicates the merger policy regime of a spell-period.
The other included variables capture, in turn, the impact of EC investigation, changes in macroeconomic conditions, and cartel and market characteristics. , the cartel and market characteristics variables, and the macroeconomic variables. We only have 32,558 observations for the macroeconomic variables. Column 6 includes all the control variables. In all the specifications, we include 11 duration-interval specific dummies to describe the overall temporal profile of risk. Together, the interval dummies represent the effect of TIME [ Table 5 about here]
B. Regression Results
Starting with the effect of leniency introduction, the estimated PRE-LEN coefficients are small and statistically insignificant in the specifications in columns 1, 2 and 3. After controlling for cartel and market characteristics and/or macroeconomic fluctuations (columns 4, 5 to 6), the PRE-LEN coefficients become statistically significant and larger in absolute value than the corresponding estimates in columns 1, 2 and 3. This results suggest that the introduction of leniency expedites merger and the effect of leniency is affected by both cartel characteristics and market and economic conditions.
Turning to the effect of settlement procedure introduction, the estimated SETTLEM coefficients are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that the settlement introduction delays merger.
Looking at the effect of cartel breakdown, the estimated BREAKDOWN coefficients in columns 1, 2, 3 and 5 are not significant at conventional levels. The coefficients become positive and statistically significant after controlling for the size of cartel membership and the market characteristics (columns 4 and 6), suggesting that mergers occur at a significantly greater pace after the cartel dissolution and the impact of dissolution is associated with and/or affected by the cartel and market characteristics.
To summarize briefly the effects of the other covariates (column (6)), we find little effect of an EC investigation, the expected demand changes (∆ GDP t j and PEAK-TROUGH t j ), the unexpected shocks (POS-SHOCK t j and NEG-SHOCK t j ), interest rates, the type of industries, the market scope (after controlling for macroeconomic fluctuations) and a cartel's merger history, but a significant decreased chance of merger for cartels with a small membership and after the 2004 EU merger policy reform.
Finally, the duration-interval-specific dummies describe the logit-hazard profile for the merger spell. The estimates suggest that chances of merger decline steadly over time. But the chances are higher relative to the trend in months 101-125 and then again in months [171] [172] [173] [174] [175] [176] [177] [178] [179] [180] [181] [182] [183] [184] [185] [186] [187] [188] [189] [190] . Notice that the corresponding standard error in the last interval dramatically increases, reflecting the decreasing precision that derives from the diminished risk set.
To this point, our discussion of the hazard model is fairly simple. We have made the baseline hazard rate a function of the explanatory variables and estimated a single duration elasticity.
A potential shortfall of the specification is that attribute variation, to the extent that it has any impact, is constrained to generate parallel shifts in the logit-hazard function.
However, it is important to consider the validity of the proportionality assumption. For example, the results of Davies, Ormosi, and Graffenberger (2014) suggest that the effect of cartel dissolution on the merger hazard may not be constant over time. The generalized model reported in the last column of Table 5 allows cartel dissolution and the EC's inspection to change both the intercept and the slope of the logit-hazard function. This is achieved by re-running the regression in column (6) of Table 5 but include an interaction between BREAKDOWN and the number of months elapsed from the cartel dissolution (TIME-AFTER-BREAKDOWN Like in our analysis of merger frequency, our empirical strategy here is implemented using a before-and-after comparison across groups where we use the dates of policy introductions to identify the policies' impacts. Like before, our concern is that if alternative shocks, i.e., placebo policies, generate a better fit to the data, then the link between the antitrust policies and the pace of mergers might not be causal. To investigate, we re-run the regression in column 6 of Table 5 using alternative time breakpoints in the data and compare the maximized loglikelihoods across the different specifications.
Additional Robustness Checks
I. Leniency vs. Placebo Policy Shocks
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Each point on the graphs of Figure 9 corresponds to the maximized log-likelihood of one discrete-time hazard regression. The point 0 on the horizontal axes corresponds to the maximized log-likelihood when we impose the shocks at the dates of the leniency introduction. The points to the left (resp. right) of 0 represent the log-likelihoods when we impose the shocks before (resp. after) July 18, 1996. The maximized log-likelihood generated by leniency (−795.854) is greater than those generated by all the placebo policies.
II. Longer Pre-Leniency Observation Window
A potential caveat to the analysis in Table 5 is that the analysis time of the leniency treatment group is at most 145.5 months (i.e, the spell-periods from July 18, 1996, to June 30, 2008); but a similar restriction to short analysis times does not occur to the control group (i.e., the spell periods before July 18, 1996) . If the immediate increase in the hazard rates following the leniency introduction were due to such a statistical artefact, one could argue that our result on the relationship between leniency and the observed hazards is driven by misspecification. To examine whether this is the case, we censor all the spells in the control group at month 145 and re-run the regression in column 6 of Table 5 . Column 1 of Table 6 reports that the predicated hazards after the leniency introduction again immediately exceed the pre-leniency levels.
III. Potential Confounding Influences of DOJ Investigation
Over 30 percent of the sampled cartels affected the US markets. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the US cartel investigations often predate the EC investigations. In Table 5 we did not find a significant impact of cartel investigation on merger timing. To see whether this has been driven by the inclusion of US market cartels, in column (2) of Table 6 we exclude cartels that affect the US markets. The INSPECTION t j coefficient remains small and statistically insignificant.
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IV. Market Structure and Types of Infringement
Column (3) of Table 6 includes DISPERSION j , the standard deviation of the cartel members' estimated market shares near the end of an infringement, as an additional control variable.
The variable is constructed by using the EC's decision reports on cartelists' market shares near the end of an infringement. 25 We have data for 100 cartels on this variable. Column (4) of Table 6 includes the types of infringement (i.e, whether the cartel involves price-fixing (PRICE-FIXING j =1 if yes;=0 otherwise), market allocation (MARKET ALLOC j =1 if yes;=0 otherwise), and big rigging (BID RIGGING j =1 if yes; =0 otherwise)) as additional control variables. The main point to extract from our analysis here is that the effects of leniency and settlement are robust to the inclusion of these additional control variables.
V. Random Effects Model
Column (5) of Table 6 reports the estimates from a random effects model. In this case, the odds of merger for a cartel whose unobserved (time-invariant) characteristics place it at one standard deviation beyond the mean are (exp(0.004) − 1) × 100 ≈ 0.4% higher than for an average cartel with the same observed characteristics. However, the effect is not significant at conventional levels.
Conclusion
Mergers occur frequently among cartel members. This paper examines the nature and determinants of mergers among cartel members using a novel data set. Unlike previous empirical analysis of merger, our analysis explicitly recognizes the role of anti-cartel enforcement on cartels' incentive to merge. We find that the EC's leniency program expedites mergers. We find that the EC's settlement procedure discourages and delays merger. Moreover, we find that the forces behind the time series of merger change over time and across antitrust policies. The 24 To our best effort, we are not able to find information of the dates of the DOJ's investigation initiation for the majority of cartels that affected the American markets. There are many important policy issues that remain to be addressed, including the effects of different national antitrust policy changes, the effects of merger on market competition, and whether the new market structure post merger facilitates continued collusion. Given the long duration of some cartels, it would be interesting to see if some of the cartels use merger to create a new "balance" in the market to facilitate continued collusion after detection. 
Merger
To be considered as a merger or a JV, the degree and nature of ownership changes should meet one of the following criteria: (i) the acquiring conspirator ends up with more than 50% the shares of the acquired co-conspirator (or subsidiary), and the acquiring conspirator control less than 50% of the shares of the target before the announcement;
(ii) two (or more) co-conspirators jointly acquired control of a third firm who was not a co-conspirator until the announcement; (iii) a non-conspirator acquired more than 50% of the shares from two (or more) co-conspirators; (iv) A JV was set up to carry out more than 50% of sales or production of at least one of the conspirators, and the JV carried out less than 50% of the conspirator's activity before the announcement.
Merger date = the date of merger approval by the EC (or other competition authorities); = the date of merger becoming effective (as reported in corporate or industry press or other sources) if the approval date is not reported in the authorities' official publications.
Censoring date = December 31, 2012 (the date of data collection).
Variables
TIME-TO-MERGER
s j = Number of months elapsed from cartel j's start until it experiences event s (i.e., a merger or censoring).
MERGER t j
= A dichotomous indicator of whether during the period (t-30 days, t] cartel j experiences a merge or a join venture. This is the dependent variable for our cartel level regression analysis.
TIME t j
Number of months since cartel j's start. TIME t j -DUMMY Duration-interval-specific dummies indicating the length of TIME The total number of competitors in a cartel j during the cartel's entire course.
DISPERSION j Standard deviation of the members' market shares in cartel j.
PRICE-FIXING j =1 if cartel j fixed price and/or quality or restricted sales, production and/or capacity, =0 otherwise.
MARKET-ALLOC j =1 if cartel j divided customers or geographic markets, =0 otherwise.
BID-RIG j =1 if cartel j is a bid-rigging cartel, =0 otherwise. 
INDUSTRY TYPE
POS-SHOCK t j
Positive deviation of real annual GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott filter). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the deviations. The weight applied is the annual national GDP.
NEG-SHOCK t j
Negative deviation of real annual GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott filter). If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the deviations. The weight applied is the annual national GDP.
INTEREST t j
Annual average (real) short-term interest rates, 3-month maturity, of cartel j's relevant market at t. If the relevant geographic market consisted of multiple economic areas in multiple countries, it is the weighted average of the rates. The weight applied is the annual national GDP.
NUM-EX-MERGERS s j
The number of mergers that have occurred within a cartel prior to the current spell.
DUR-EX-MERGER s j
The duration of the prior spell within a cartel. STARTED is the number of cartels that have started by the end of the period; ∆ GDP is the is the annual growth rate of the real gross domestic product in the EU; PEAK-TROUGH=1 if the period is in a peak-to-trough of a business cycle, =0
otherwise. POS-SHOCK (resp. NEG-SHOCK) is the positive (resp. negative) deviation of real annual EU GDP from trend line (using the Hodrick-Prescott filter).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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